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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF SAFETY, AND NEGLIGENCE WITH
HINDSIGHT, AS TESTS OF DEFECT
(A

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PRACTICING LAWYER)

Gerald J. Adler*
IT has been thirty years since Justice Roger Traynor, concurring in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,I first enunciated the rule
and rationale of strict products liability. Almost twenty years
elapsed before his brethren joined him in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products,Inc.2 to make strict liability the rule, at least for
personal injuries to consumers which are caused by defective
products. Understanding the concept of a defective product,
applying and defining its limits, remain major problems, however, despite all that has occurred in the decade that has now
passed since Greenman. It is the thesis of this article that the
guidelines are now sufficiently clear and are ready for better definition and easier application. We shall attempt to do so.
Subsequent to Chief Justice Traynor's recent retirement, the
California Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp.,3 gave some guidance, but unfortunately not
enough. That case stands generally for two major propositions:
first, the plaintiff need only show that a product was defective,
not that it was unreasonably dangerous; second, that "crashworthiness" bears strongly on the concept of defect. Those propositions, while extremely important, do not, of themselves, tell lawyers and judges enough to help them with the determination of
when liability should flow from a product-caused injury.
There are, however, three other propositions in the case that,
when properly understood, do give the necessary guidance. First,
the court made clear that which has long been settled by courts
and commentators: strict liability is neither absolute liability nor
insurance; not all harms which flow from the use of a product are
compensable.4 Second, while refusing to specifically define de* B.S., Cornell University; J.D., The University of Houston; LL.M. (in International
Law) New York University; LL.M., Columbia University. Formerly Acting Professor of
Law, now Lecturer in Law at the University of California at Davis, and affiliated with
the Sacramento firm of Crow, Lytle, Schleh & Gilwee.
1. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion).
2. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
3. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
4. See id. at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42.
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fect, the court did pick up the Escola terminology of Justice Traynor, that an "implied warranty of safety of the product" attends
the sale.- Finally, it clearly followed Justice Traynor's view, as
put forth in Escola, that strict products liability cases had to be
purged of negligence proof and, of their negligence complexion.'
In refusing to define "defect", the court recognized "the difficulties inherent in giving content to the defectiveness standard,"
but simply noted, by reference to an article by Justice Traynor,
that "there is now a cluster of useful precedents to supersede the
confusing decisions based on indiscriminate invocation of sales
and warranty law."" . It is possible, of course, that the court was
at that point saying to bench and bar that they should simply
choose which among the "cluster of useful precedents" would be
appropriate for the particular case. Such an intent, however, does
little for the judge or lawyer who requires a more precise standard
with which to evaluate a case or guide a jury. It is also possible
that the court was unwilling to forge still another definition when
it was that day rejecting the unreasonably dangerous test generally used to determine defect. Finally, it is possible that the court
felt that it had given sufficient guidance in the opinion itself with
its "implied warranty of safety" terminology. This observer of the
California products liability scene believes that the last is the
most likely explanation; that the guideposts are there; and without the necessity of further defining defect, the key to resolution
of future cases has been provided.
The problem, quite simply, is to understand how strict liability differs from insurance, whether an implied warranty of safety
is a useful test of defect, and whether we can move from negligence to strict liability while stopping short of insurance.

I.

STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY RATIONALE

Justice Traynor's initial language in Escola of "absolute liability" became "strict liability" when, some twenty years later,
he wrote the Greenman opinion, but the idea that persisted was
5. Compare Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 442 (1944)
(concurring opinion) with Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 129 n.10, 501 P.2d
1153, 1159 n.10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 439 n.10 (1972).
6. Compare Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436,
440 (1944) (concurring opinion) with Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501
P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
6.1 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134 n. 16, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 n. 16,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 n. 16 (1972), quoting Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Productsand Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 373 (1965).
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that liability would follow when an article placed on the market
by a manufacturer, who knows that it is to be used without
inspection, "proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being."7 Warranty rules were rejected, but implied in the product's presence on the market "was a representation that it would

safely do the jobs for which it was built."' Proof of negligent
conduct was not necessary, but the reduction of "hazards to life
and health inherent in defective products that reach the market"
was the first of many reasons used by Justice Traynor to support
liability.' The proof was removed, but the deterrent to recurrent
injury-generators remained.'0
The economic justification, which has come to be known as

enterprise liability, was to assure that manufacturers bear the
cost of injuries resulting from their defective products, distributing the risk of injury to the public as a cost of doing business.'"
Such a justification is, however, far more than a mere economic

modification; it is a means of social control by which one necessarily conditions the efforts of manufacturers and others against
whom enterprise liability is applicable.12 He who created the
danger, and who has the better capacity and expertise to control
it, is thus encouraged toward the protection of human health and
life by safety in design and production, lest his product become
3
uneconomic and uncompetitive by virtue of increased costs.'
Public policy and economics were reinforced by the proposition that the consumer is lulled by advertising and marketing
devices into accepting products on faith. Thus the basis was laid
7. Compare Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (concurring opinion) with Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62,
377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
8. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
9. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(concurring opinion).
10. But cf. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 440, 191 N.E.2d
81, 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 598 (1963) (Burke, J., dissenting): "The purpose of such liability
is not to regulate conduct with a view to eliminating accidents". See generally Calabresi,
Does the Fault System Optimally Control PrimaryAccident Costs?, 33 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 429, 447-49 (1968).
11. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
12. See Morris, EnterpriseLiability and the ActuarialProcess - The Insignificance
of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 597-99 (1961).
13. Cf. Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 380, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960); Codling v. Paglia, 32
N.Y.2d 330, 341, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627-28, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468-69 (1973).
14. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944)
(concurring opinion).
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for use of an implied representation, akin to an express warranty
via advertising, that the product is suitable and safe for the intended use. 15 One jurisdiction, Oregon, bothered by the logical
extension of enterprise liability beyond the products field, slowly
but surely over the past decade has come to focus on that aspect:
the tacit representation that a product poses no unreasonable
danger when put to the use for which it was manufactured is both
a test of defect and a limitation on absolute liability."0
Despite occasional similar doubts, enterprise liability, without much emphasis on the representation, has come to be accepted as the means by which risks are transferred to and among
sellers as a matter of legal policy.1" We have, as a result, reached
a point of forcing insurance on all those engaged in bringing the
product to the consumer; insurance does not bring liability which
would otherwise exist, but it does make it reasonable to impose
that liability.' 8 There remains some lingering doubt perhaps
about all this in light of modern long-arm jurisdictional statutes
which allow the injured consumer to reach manufacturers directly, 9 but there is apparently no turning back on that ground.
There may also be doubts about the insurability of all the risks
of injury from defective products. 0 The resolution of this problem, however, has to be in either a reevaluation of the need for
the product at all, or a redefinition of the risks against which we
are requiring insurance.
15. See Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co,, 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532,
537 (1952); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 328, 232 A.2d 879, 887
(1967); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 15, 181 N.E.2d
399, 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 370 (1962); But see Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44
N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965) (strict liability not conditioned upon advertising to
promote sales).
16. The sequence is mirrored in the following cases: Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc.,
241 Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Heaton
v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 509
P.2d 529 (Ore. 1973). Chief Justice O'Connell's role is especially instructive as seen from
his opinions in these cases, whether writing for the court, concurring, or in dissent.
17. Compare, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 440, 191
N.E.2d 81, 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597-98 (1963) (Burke, J., dissenting) with Vandermark
v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964);
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 341, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468 (1973);
Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952). See also Cowan, Some
Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1090-93 (1965).
18. For an excellent discussion of the point with citations, see Magrine v. Spector,
100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
19. See, e.g., CAL. CV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West Supp. 1973).
20. Cf., Willis, Product Liability Without Fault-Some Problems and Proposals, 15
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 648, 657 (1960).
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The risk is definable in a number of ways. One general way
is to focus on the type of injury and the person injured. It seems
clear enough that the original emphasis for Justice Traynor was
on injury to the life or limb of the consumer. Extended by his
opinion in Seely v. White Motor Co., 2' to physical injury to property, but not to economic loss alone, the emphasis remains on the
consumer versus the commercial relationship.2 Warranty and
misrepresentation law remain available for the solely economic or
commercial loss, reflecting the hierarchy of values into which
modem judicial systems generally seem to place, in descending
order of importance, the protection of person, property, and pocketbook. Certainly in tort law, which has long been reluctant to
move, even with negligence, into the area of economic loss alone
absent intent or representation, the reluctance and hesitation is
not surprising when liability without fault is the issue and the
economic and social horizons are still unclear.
Another way to define the risk is in terms of the type of defect
which is compensable under strict liability theory. It is that issue
to which we now turn. We do so bearing in mind the rationale we
have been discussing, because from that we should be able to
better understand what Justice Traynor described in Escola as a
product which "proves to have a defect," traceable "to the product as it reached the market."
II.

DEFECT AND THE WARRANTY OF SAFETY

A.

Defective When?

1. As It Reached the Market
To the extent that the rationale for strict liability is grounded
in control of a product, and that control stops when the product
reaches the market, it is appropriate to use that point to judge
defect. Contract-type actions utilizing warranty theory thus
might point to the time of manufacture, sale, or distribution,
especially when statutes of limitation are at issue. When contract
actions become implied warranty actions for consequential damages to person or property, such reasoning has led New York to
the indefensible result of a cause of action, within its implied
warranty-strict liability rationale, being barred before injury oc21. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
22. For the contrary view, supportable perhaps in logic and the disparities of bargaining position, see the dissent of Justice Peters in Seely v. White Motor Co., id at 19, 403
P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
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curs.2 3 Among other things wrong with such a result is that it
ignores the proposition that a warranty runs for a particular period of time, perhaps a rental period,2 4 or more generally, the
2
period of a product's intended or reasonably foreseeable use. 1
When implied warranty and strict liability come together to be
applied to a defect in a product, it should be apparent that the
breach of the implied warranty of safety, to which Justice Traynor and the California Supreme Court have addressed themselves, takes place when the product proves unsafe during the
period of intended or reasonably foreseeable use. To the extent
that the periods of intended and reasonably foreseeable use
differ, with the latter being longer, it would seem that the implied
warranty of safety is also extended, unless appropriately limited
by the manufacturer and brought home to the user.
Thus the manufacturer, who is held to the standard of an
expert, knowing of reasonably foreseeable use for a particular
period of time, breaches the implied warranty of safety, made
when the product was marketed, if the product, when being used
as intended or as is reasonably foreseeable, proves unsafe and the
injury is attributable to the product.
2. Defective At Time of Injury
Justice Traynor's language, we recall, referred to a product
that "proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being." Assuming the product to be unchanged, the defect had
to be there since being marketed, but it did not become apparent
until injury. If the liability does not attach until injury, the manufacturer's responsibility for the product thus continues, perhaps
only constructively, until injury.
This proposition, which dovetails nicely with the warranty
for a particular period of time, goes beyond the manufacturer's
usual control of the product in the period from marketing to
injury. It defines injury as the point at which the implied warranty of safety is breached, as the point just prior to which the
manufacturer still can avoid breach, and as the point at which
the manufacturer must avoid breach or be held responsible for
the consequences. The injury must still be traceable to the prod23. See Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
24. See, e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965).
25. Cf. Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826
(1964).
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uct as marketed, but the condition subsequent to liability occurs
only with injury. At the very least this must mean that the concept is not static, but must change with time."
3. Defective At Time of Trial
Unlike the implied warranty of safety, strict liability goes
beyond control and point of injury. The rationale is directed beyond conduct. The focus is on the product, a product which probably remains on the market subsequent to the particular injury.
The particular product and others like it may still be on the
market at the time of trial. Since one of the goals of strict products liability is to eliminate recurrent risk-generators, without
requiring proof of fault, the concept of defect must retain the
capacity of movement in time so that judgment of the product
comes at judgment-time-at the time of trial.
This suggestion is not new. We have at times even in the law
of negligence and proximate cause judged conduct with the benefit of hindsight. 21 If we do the same here, as has been suggested
by commentators for some time,2 8 we do not reach insurance or
absolute liability. We simply ask with the benefit of hindsight:
knowing that the product did in fact prove unsafe under given
circumstances, would it be reasonable to now manufacture or
market the product in the same way?25 1 In other words, at the

time of trial we would apply the usual negligence test looking
forward, knowing however, that which may have been unknown
or unknowable at the time the product was marketed. Strict liability so applied would thus avoid both the reqirement of proving
fault and the burden of insurance, appropriately meeting the
goals and rationale identified as appropriate for products which
prove to be unsafe. The concept would be understandable to a
26. For the implied acceptance of time of injury as the point for judging a product's
defectiveness, see Ault v. International Harvester Co., 10 Cal. 3d 337, 515 P.2d 313, 110
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973).
27. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 347-56 162 N.E. 99, 101-05
(1928) (dissenting opinion); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965).
28. See, e.g., Dickerson, ProductsLiability: How Good Does a ProductHave to Be?,
42 IND. L.J. 301, 331 (1967); Keeton, Product Liability and the Automobile, 9 FORUM 1, 8
(1973); id, Products Liability-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REv. 131, 141 (1972);
id, Products Liability-Inadequacyof Information, 48 TaxAs L. REv. 398, 403 (1970); id,
Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of
Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 568 (1969); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort

Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829-33 (1973); id, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965).
28 1. The application of this test can be seen in Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.Supp.
753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
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jury concerned with consumer product safety and would also be
consistent with the social engineering and control aspects implicit
in strict products liability.
B.
1.

Proof of Defect

Shifting the Burden

Whether or not one accepts the proposition that the defect
which existed in the product when it reached the market is judged
at that time-the time of injury or the time of trial-it is still
necessary, under current theory, to prove that the product was
defective. The element of defect differentiates strict liability from
insurance concepts or absolute liability since mere use of the
product and injury therefrom does not automatically bring liability. Use of the product in the intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner with consequent injury caused by a defect would, however, cause liability to be imposed. The issue then would be a
combined one of defect and of cause. Cause, factual and legal, is
required, but the product in question is not condemned as defective unless, when viewed with hindsight from the breach of the
implied warranty of safety or from trial, it is defectively designed,
manufactured, or marketed.
Recall that a major purpose of Cronin and of all strict products liability theory is to relieve the plaintiff of proof of negligence. With that as a beginning, it is appropriate to talk about
relieving the plaintiff of anything other than showing an injury
when using the product in the intended manner. If a product is
intended to be used in a given way, if it is so used and it malfunctions, fails, or otherwise causes injury during that use, it seems
clear that a breach of the implied warranty of safety has occurred.
There are cases which have permitted the use of circumstantial evidence on the issues of defect and cause.2 1 Other cases permit the establishment of a defective condition from a malfunction
alone." Another way of putting it, and perfectly consistent with
the implied warranty of safety thesis, is that a product is defective when it causes injury due to a failure of the product to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of the
29. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1969); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964).
30. See, e.g., Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.Pa. 1973);
cf. La Gorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D.Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 671 (3d Cir.
1969).
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product's nature and intended function.31 After this is shown, the
next step would be to put the burden on the defendant to negate
defect in somewhat of a res ipsa loquitorfashion, and for the same
reason, that is, more probably than not the product producing
injury was defectively manufactured or designed. 2
2. Legacies of Implied Warranty
Because implied warranty is so intertwined with strict liability, is applied by its terms in some jurisdictions in lieu of strict
liability, and in others is used alternatively sometimes at the
choice of plaintiff and sometimes dictated by the type of injury,
it is important to understand the common law and statutory
history of implied warranty as it relates to consumer injuries and
damages.
Anglo-American courts have long utilized the idea that a
consumer product, known by the manufacturer or the seller to be
used for specific purposes, must be fit and proper for the purpose
and use for which it is designed and intended. 33 That idea has its
current statutory counterpart in the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. 4 Without regard to representation, the
plaintiff can recover for breach of an implied warranty when a
product, which is not fit for the particular purpose, causes
35
personal injury or property damage; such a product is defective.
The product may also be defective when it turns out to be not of
"merchantable quality."3 A product is not of merchantable quality when it is not suitable for the ordinary purpose for which such
products are used.3 7 Thus, breach occurs with failure, but the
warranties differ, in that fitness relates to intended purpose while
merchantability relates to ordinary purposes.
Although often intertwined in the cases, there is a distinction
between the two warranties: fitness, when the purpose is known
and there is reliance on the seller, is a much more exacting stan31. See Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d
684 (1967), aff'd, 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
32. For discussion of the approach, see Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826, 832 (1964) (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting).
33. See, e.g., Brown v. Edgington, 133 Eng. Rep. 751 (C.P. 1841); but see White v.
Oakes, 88 Me. 367, 34 A.2d 175 (1896).
34. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
35. See Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1962).
36. Id. at 922. But cf. Traynor, supra n.6.1, at 367-71 (noting UNIFORM COMmRCIAL
CODE § 2-314 but criticising deviation from the norm as a test of a defective product).
37. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(c).
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dard than that of merchantability, in which the expectations of
the buyer are restricted to the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used. That distinction is a useful one from which to
proceed to examine the implied warranty of safety.
3. Safety or Reasonable Safety?
Bread baked with a pin in it is unsafe and defective because
it is intended to be eaten.18 Brake fluid which is designed to bring
a vehicle to a halt under normal driving conditions is defective
when it fails in its intended purpose. 9 Whether or not the bread
or brake fluid falls within the warranties of fitness for a particular
purpose or of merchantable quality is not relevant. The important point is the failure in the use for which the product is designed or intended, and the assumption by the buyer that the
product would not be unsafe when put to that use. As Justice
39.
Traynor put it in his article, the key is "unexpected danger."

1

The manufacturer is charged as an expert with guaranteeing
the safety of its product; ".

.

. he must know it [the product] is

fit, or take the consequences, if it proves destructive." 4 The test
then, is one of absolute safety when the product is used as designed and intended, whether we speak of human consumption"
or of operation on the public highway. 2 Failure of a product when
so used is equivalent to a breach of the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. Such a breach, when it results in injury to a
human being or physical injury to property, is also a breach of the
warranty of safety. This warranty is absolute, and breach brings
liability.
When a product brings injury while being put to its ordinary
but not necessarily intended use, or is put to a reasonably foreseeable use in a reasonably foreseeable environment, it becomes appropriate to rethink this implied warranty of absolute safety. It
seems clear that any product may cause or aggravate or at least
not prevent injury under some circumstances." Since it would be
38. Cf. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
39. Cf. Begley v. Ford Motor Co., 476 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1973).
39.1 Traynor, supra n.6.1, at 370. Justice Traynor emphasizes, however, that knowl.
edge of generic dangers does not necessarily make a product nondefective so as to eliminate manufacturer liability. See id. at 370-71.
40. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 466, 150 P.2d 436, 442 (1944)
(concurring opinion).
41. Cf. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
42. See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965).
43. See Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1957) cert. denied,
355 U.S. 855.
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undersirable to transfer to the enterprise all risks of loss from the
use of a product, the implied warranty of safety for reasonably
foreseeable, although not intended, use should become one of
reasonable safety.
An example from the automotive design crashworthiness
area will help put the concept into focus. In the Cronin case, the
injury was caused when a hasp, which was part of a locking device
designed to keep bread trays from moving forward into the
driver's compartment of a bread delivery truck, failed to prevent
such movement after a collision. Because the failure was in the
function for which the hasp was intended and designed, the
breach was of the warranty of absolute safety. Similarly, in
Engberg v. Ford Motor Company,43 ' the breaking of a seat belt
during a crash was a failure in the intended and designed use of
the seat belt. In neither case was the crash the intended purpose
of the vehicle, but in both cases the liability is, in our terms,
absolute.
On the other hand, when a vehicle becomes involved in a
crash, and injury results because of a design which was not what
it might have been, the test cannot be absolute safety. In Badorek
v. General Motors Corp.,43 .2 for example, injuries to the vehicle
occupants were caused or enhanced by the design and construction of the gas tank. After a rear-end collision, the tank ruptured,
allowing flaming gasoline to escape into the passenger compartment. The court, which was concerned with strict liability, cited
negligence authority and conceded that neither a crash-proof car
nor a car that "would have to look or drive like a Sherman Tank"
was expected or required.4 3.3 The warranty was breached, but in
our terms it was a warranty of reasonable safety, tested by negligence with hindsight, since neither the gas tank nor the car was
intended or designed for crashes. Crashes are, however, clearly
foreseeable.
The time for making the judgment as to the breach of the
warranty of reasonable safety would still be the time of trial
knowing the circumstances of use and the danger in fact. The test
remains that of negligence with hindsight. A fact issue may well
43.1 205 N.W. 2d 104 (S.D. 1973).
43.2 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (opinion vacated
by grant of hearing by California Supreme Court and not citable in California; case
remanded and settled).
43.3 Id. at 920, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 316-17, citing Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359
F.2d 822, 827 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion), quoting N. Y. Times, March 8, 1966
at 36M. See also Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
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arise as to whether a particular use was intended or simply reasonably foreseeable. When this is at issue, an objective standard
should be applied in order to preclude unreasonably strained extensions or limitations of intended use put forth by either plaintiff
or defendant. If the use was intended, the jury's role would be to
determine only causation and damages. If the use was not intended but was reasonably foreseeable, the additional test of negligence with hindsight would have to be inserted prior to a determination of liability. If the injury-causing use was neither intended nor reasonably foreseeable, the product would simply not
be defective.
The solution proposed is perfectly consistent with all that
has transpired in strict products liability through Cronin and its
crashworthiness doctrine. The manufacturer should reasonably
foresee highway crashes; his duty is to make the vehicle reasonably, but not absolutely, safe under such circumstances. There is
simply no escaping the proposition that safety is a compromise"
which becomes reasonable to recognize when product injury
comes in a foreseeable, but unintended manner, incident, or use."
When, however, the product will not "safely do the jobs for which
it was built,"46 then the test becomes that of absolute safety. The
warranty of safety is thus given content in terms of absoluteness
or reasonableness dependent upon the circumstances of use and
of injury.
C.

Remnants of Negligence

The Cronin court would have us purge negligence from the
proof in a strict liability case. The court does so by eliminating
the Restatement doctrine of unreasonable danger. When that
goes, the objective ordinary consumer test goes with it, because
that is one way of defining the unreasonably dangerous product 17 -' As we have seen with intended use, however, objectivity
44. See Drummond v. General Motors Corp., 2 CCH Products Liability Rptr., 5611
(Cal. Super. 1966); cf. O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
45. See Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1972);
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433,
437 (1972); Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App.3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970).
46. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); Pearson v. State, 105 Cal. Rptr. 67, 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(advance sheet only; withdrawn by order of court).
47.1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A, comment i (1965) states the test: "The
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics." See discussion in Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore.
467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967).
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must remain to some extent if strict liability is not to become
insurance. Elimination of the "unreasonably dangerous" concept,
as a necessary jury finding, is the Cronin method of eliminating
the "negligence complexion" from the issue of defect.. 2 The focus
can then appropriately be on the product, rather than on the
conduct of the defendant who has designed, manufactured, or
marketed the product. The plaintiff's case, purged of negligence,
then goes forward simply on the Escola-Greenman-Croninimplied warranty of safety rationale.
Yet, as we shall see, the Restatement abounds in negligence
language. The cases affirm that proof of defective design also
proves negligence. 8 Commentators make the same point. 9 The
best of products liability lawyers say the same thing even today. °
In the context of defectively designed products, judges fear a flood
of litigation and worry about effects on the industry.' Horrendous
results are foreseen unless a no-fault system of limited compensa52
tion is introduced.
Several points must be made about these fears and comments. Trial lawyers see strict products liability cases as technical cases, in which a verdict of liability becomes more doubtful
and damages become potentially much lower than a similar case
in which negligence, as we usually understand it, can be proved.
The answer to that, it would seem, is to argue the rationale of
strict liability to the jury, at least in those jurisdictions in which
attorneys may discuss the law in argument. Trial lawyers also
view no-fault with deemphasis on general damages as unwise,
unfair, perhaps unconstitutional, and certainly not in the interest
of the consumer. They see no-fault as the inevitable end of unlimited strict liability. They are probably right; therefore, the answer
would seem to be to adopt the strict but limited liability we have
been outlining.
47.2 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
48. See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 10 Cal. 3d 337, 515 P.2d 313, 110
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973).
49. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, 659 nn. 72, 73 (4th ed. 1971) (strict liability
adds little or nothing to a manufacturer's negligence).
50. The writer has most recently heard it in 1973 at products liability seminars
conducted by the Practising Law Institute and the California Trial Lawyers Association.
51. The arguments were rejected in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134,
501 P.2d 1153, 1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 443 (1972); Badorek v. General Motors Corp.,
11 Cal.App.3d 902, 924-25, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 320 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
52. See Sandler, Strict Liability and the Need for Legislation, 53 VA. L. REV. 1509,
1514-21 (1967); Willis, supra note 20.
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Limitations on strict liability are easily handled for design

problems, but with the time for judging the product and alternatives moved to the time of trial. Failure to warn cases would be

similarly analyzed. 3 Nor would there seem to be any reason to
treat drugs differently.
It is in the drug area that most cases and commentators see
problems. Negligence reigns supreme." The utility of drugs seems
to outweigh the occasional misfortune to the unusually

hypersensitive or allergic individual." Strict liability and negligence are seen here as virtually identical."

Yet the lesson of

Escola is that "however intermittently such injuries may occur
and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their oc-

currence is a constant risk and a general one" against which the
manufacturer is best situated to afford protection. 7 Negligence
then is not the issue, and this is beginning to be recognized in the

blood transfusion cases."' Since the use is intended, liability follows when harm results. It is irrelevant under this analysis that

the particular user who suffers adverse effects from the product
is a member of a miniscule group or is even the only one who

suffers the result.-"-1 This may well have a social engineering effect
and increase the safety of the product, 9 but regardless of that
effect the risk is shared. It is quite possible that some drugs may
be condemned by this analysis, but more probably the risk is
simply absorbed as part of the cost of doing business in accord-

ance with the Escola rationale. 0 When the risk becomes great
enough the product may indeed be withdrawn from the market.!

It is submitted that this is the expected and desired effect of the
strict products liability theory which we have been discussing.
53. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRis § 402A, Commentj (1965).
54. See id. Comment k.
55. See Lewis v. Baker, 243 Or. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966); Cochran v. Brooke, 243 Or.
89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966).
56. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir. 1969).
57. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(concurring opinion).
58. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1970); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (1972); Carter v,Inter.
Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
58.1. The same point is made by Justice Traynor as it relates both to blood and drugs.
See Traynor, supra n. 6.1 at 365-66.
59. Cf. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis:An Analysis and a Proposal,24 STAN,
L. REv. 439 (1972).
60. For application of the negligence with hindsight test to drugs, see Keeton,
Products Liability-Drugsand Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REv. 131 (1972).
61. For such an effect on the cigarette industry, see White, Strict Liability of Cigarette Manufacturersand Assumption of Risk, 29 LA. L. REV.589, 592-94 (1969).
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LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF THE WARRANTY OF

IV.

SAFETY
A.
1.

Proximate Cause

Cause in Fact

There can be no argument with the proposition that as a
matter of fact, the product must cause the injury in order for
liability to flow. If an airplane fails after flying into cyclonic
winds which would down any plane, 2 or an automobile wheel
63
breaks after it has left the road and gone down a steep incline,
the product failure is factually not related to a defect. Such a
proposition is almost self-evident, but itshould never be forgotten
by the trial lawyer.
2.

Extent and Manner of Injury

Two concepts should be borne in mind when an injury
occurs in an unexpected way. It is black-letter Restatement
law that "if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to another [that is, if cause in fact exists], the fact
that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent
of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent
him from being liable."64 Liability will only be excused when to
the court, "after the event and looking back from the harm," it
appears "highly extraordinary that [the conduct] should have
brought about the harm." 5 This negligence with hindsight test
for proximate cause may be usefully transferred to focus on the
product. Since the warranty of safety is absolute in the product's
intended use, the egg-shelled-skull or hypersensitive plaintiff is
protected, and the hindsight test is only necessary when we speak
of unintended but reasonably foreseeable uses. The court would
thus initially control the cases which go to jury. The unexpectable
event, harm, or manner in which the harm occurs does not preclude liability, and the jury will judge the product as does the
court initially, that is, "after the event and looking back from the
harm." The burgeoning crashworthy cases, for example, become
manageable with such treatment, as do all design, failure to
warn, and drug cases.
62. But cf. O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
63. Cf. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 10 Cal. 3d 337, 515 P.2d 313, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 369 (1973).

64.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 435(1) (1965).

65. Id. § 435(2).
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3.

To Whom Injury Occurs

The person whose use of the product is not intended, but who
is injured through the intended use of the product, is entitled to
the same protection of absolute safety guaranteed to the user."
Those who are injured by the product in its normal environment
are also entitled to the same protection.67 But those whose injuries
come as a result of a product failure or fault in the course of the
reasonably foreseeable but unintended use of the product should
be remitted to the warranty of reasonable safety with the benefit
of hindsight. The user's conduct may affect the injured party's
recovery, but only insofar as it may add a tortfeasor-joint if the
product fails the test of reasonable safety or sole if the product
passes the test but the user's conduct falls below the standard of
reasonable care. If such cases were treated otherwise, the social
engineering aspects of the strict products liability rationale would
be unnecessarily ignored when as a matter of68fact, law, and policy
the product has failed the appropriate tests.
Once again the distinction comes into focus with the automo68 "t defendant Paglia's four-month
bile cases. In Codling v. Paglia,
old car crossed into the path of plaintiff Codling's car as a result
of steering difficulty. A finding of causally related defect would
properly result in the liability of the manufacturer toward Codling. In addition, a negligent response to the situation by Paglia
would give Codling joint tortfeasors against whom to proceed.
Codling would be entitled to the warranty of absolute safety from
the manufacturer.
On the other hand, if the Paglia car's steering difficulty was
traceable to its having struck an unusually large rock shortly
before,1 .2 the manufacturer's warranty might only be that of reasonable safety. If the rock were larger than the steering apparatus
was designed to withstand, although the driving use was intended, the manufacturer's liability would be judged by the negli66. Cf. Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Elmore v.
American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); 1 L. FRUMER
and M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY, § 5.03(1)(c), at 35 (1967) (within range or vicinity
of probable use).
67. See Green v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 485 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1973); Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring
opinion) ("any person who comes in lawful contact with it").
68. But cf. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461
(1973).
68.1 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
68.2 Cf. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967).
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gence with hindsight test. If the driver were negligent in continuing to drive after hitting the rock, responsibility would be shared.
4.

When Injury Occurs

Passage of time is a relevant issue as it relates to the period
of intended use during which the warranty of safety remains
alive. If a manufacturer intends to limit the warranty, as he
might for instance for the number of hours use an aircraft engine
is intended to have before overhaul or replacement, it becomes
incumbent on the manufacturer to make that limitation on the
warranty clear.
Should there be no express limitation, the passage of time
becomes relevant on the issue of cause.69 But if the product is
being used in the intended manner at the time of injury, proof of
the absence of proximate cause should be shifted to the defendant.7 0 Consistent with all that has gone before, if the use is not
intended, the passage of time would become merely another factor in the assurance of reasonable safety of the product at the
time of trial, an issue for both court and jury, and to a large
degree a matter of "common sense" and "fair judgment."'
5.

Third-PartConduct

In discussing the problems of nonusers we have referred to
the conduct of the user, suggesting that it will not insulate the
manufacturer of a product which fails either the test of absolute
or reasonable safety. The problems become somewhat more difficult when third-party conduct intervenes subsequent to marketing but prior to failure. There is, however, one major hallmark to
guide us.
The inability of the manufacturer in Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Company,72 to shield itself from liability because of the
negligence of the dealer was no aberration limited to the automobile business. It was simply an extension of the settled proposition of law that when a reasonably foreseeable third-party act is
69. See Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 641-45, 105 Cal. Rptr.
890, 896-98 (1973); Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202 166
S.E.2d 173 (1969).
70. See Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826
(1964).
71. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 354, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928) (Andrews,
J., dissenting).
72. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
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one of the hazards which make an actor negligent, "such an act
whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal
does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused
thereby. 7 3 The test, when applied to strict products liability, is
the same, except that the focus is on a defective product, defined
in terms of safety or reasonable safety at the time of the intended
use or at trial respectively. Some examples will help explain the
concept.
The prescription of an unsafe drug by a negligent physician,
aware of the drug's dangers but induced by the manufacturer to
prescribe it, will not cut off the liability of the manufacturer when
the drug is consumed by a patient in the intended dosage.74 Failure of an employer to correct a discovered problem or to install
an available or proffered safety device should not insulate the
manufacturer of the machine when an employee is injured using
the machine as intended. 75 The negligent failure of independent
installers to attach specified safety devices should not insulate
the manufacturer of the product when it fails while being used for
the purpose intended. 7 The negligent use of a product unsafe for
its intended use does not cut off liability to a person suffering
detriment as the result of injury to the user. 77 In all of these cases
the negligent third-party conduct is within the ambit of risk
which flows from the marketing of an unsafe product put to its
intended use.
Comparison to a product involved in an injury-causing incident, but not when being used in the intended manner or the
normal environment will highlight the difference. A bathinette
exposed to a household fire which increases the danger of the
fire,7 toxic fumes in the aftermath of airplane crashes and fires,
73. Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 69, 507 P.2d 653, 664, 107 Cal. Rptr.
45, 56 (1973) citing Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 163-64, 486 P.2d 151, 158, 95 Cal. Rptr.

623, 630, quoting RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF

TORTS § 449 (1965); cf. Bolm v. Triumph

Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 159, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973): "Assuming that in
each case the defect is 'a substantial factor in bringing about [the] injury or damages,'
what possible justification is there for disallowing a claim against the manufacturer whose
defective product results in injury after a foreseeable intervening cause?"
74. See Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45
(1973).
75. Cf. Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1973); Yale & Towne, Inc. v. Sharpe, 118 Ga. App. 480, 164 S.E.2d 318 (1968); Bexiga v.
Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
76. But see State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied
386 U.S. 912 (1967).
77. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
78. See Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
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and increased burning and smoke from polyurethane insulation
in walls exposed to fire, are all within the risk of the product
defect, regardless of the conduct which caused the fire in the first
instance. Liability for the enhanced injury falls on the original
manufacturer, perhaps as a joint tortfeasor. On the other hand,
use by nonexperts of a product obviously designed for experts, 9
as with the theft and flight of an aircraft by one unqualified to
fly it, or an intentional act not within the risk created by the use
of the product,8" or a sufficient passage of time combined with
intervening negligent acts,"' will cut off liability since these risks
are not within the ambit of a reasonably safe product even when
viewed with the benefit of hindsight.
B.
1.

Conduct of the Plaintiff

ContributoryFault

In the context of that which has gone before, especially the
lessons of continued liability for a product which is unsafe-in-fact
despite subsequent conduct of a negligent character, we now turn
to the contributory fault of the injured plaintiff. The conventional
learning has been that contributory negligence will not bar recovery in actions which sound in warranty or strict liability.8 2 That
learning is, however, not without challenge.8 Recently, perhaps
on the theory that a breach of warranty is a wrongful act,84 the
New York Court of Appeals, in Codling v. Paglia,5 without citing
legal authority or policy justification, simply announced that
what it terms "contributory fault" is a defense under its implied
warranty theory for personal injury. Its application goes so far as
cutting off liability to a bystander when a third party's faulty
conduct has intervened.
349 U.S. 923 (1955).
79. Cf. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
80. Raatikka v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 8 Mich. App. 638, 155 N.W.2d 205
(1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442(b) (1965).
81. See Pearson v. State, 105 Cal. Rptr. 67 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
82. See, e.g., Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443
(1972); Kassouf v. Lee Bros., Inc., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A, Comment n.
83. See Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431 P.2d 108 (1967)
(dissenting opinion); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969);
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
84. See Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306
N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969).
85. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
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Besides being impressed with the advocacy that brought the
Court of Appeals to such a conclusion, one must wonder whether
the court was attempting to nudge the New York State Legislature into the adoption of a comparative fault system, which many
thought the court itself was about to adopt."6 Whatever motivating force for the holding, it was apparently not the risk-duty
doctrine so ably enunciated by the great Chief Judge Cardozo of
that court,87 or the lessons of the Restatement to which we have
been referring and which relate intervening conduct, risk, and
proximate cause.
If failure of the user to act reasonably so as to discover a
defect, or to act reasonably under the circumstances once defect
has evidenced itself, is not foreseeable, with foresight or with
hindsight, and thus not within the ambit of risk of the defect, one
cannot argue with the court. The problem very simply is that the
court did not, at least in its opinion, address the issue. A breach
of a duty implied in law, whether the duty of reasonable conduct
or the duty to produce a safe or reasonably safe product, is simply
not necessarily cut off by conduct within the risk of the breach
of duty. The conclusion would apparently follow from the court's
opinion, that a driver, faced with a product-caused problem, who
objectively acts unreasonably under the circumstances, not only
cannot recover against the defendant who manufactured and
marketed the product and put him into the particularly difficult
position, but neither can a bystander injured as a result. One is
tempted to conclude that the policy support for such a position
was omitted from the opinion because it is in fact non-existent,
given a rationale of strict liability in tort or New York's implied
warranty equivalent. If there are circumstances when failure to
discover a problem or failure to act reasonably to avoid catastrophe after a defect has evidenced itself are not within the risk
of a defect, the court's conclusion would be correct. Otherwise, it
must be defended on other grounds. The New York court is simply too good a court to reach such a conclusion without a policy
to justify it. Let us hypothesize.
There have been and are many anachronisms in our law. One
such relates to the proposition that contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff will bar recovery when the defendant is at
fault, but will not bar recovery when the defendant is liable although fault need not be demonstrated, for example, when a
86. Id. at 345, 298 N.E.2d at 630, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (Jasen, J., concurring).
87. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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warranty is breached or a product is found defective. At a time
when legislatures and courts are moving toward the adoption of
a comparative negligence system, it would seem appropriate to
reexamine the proposition that a plaintiff who is at fault can
recover without penalty from a defendant without fault. The term
contributory fault, adopted in lieu of contributory negligence,
becomes adaptable to a system of comparative fault far more
broadly than a system of comparative negligence alone in a tort
system which includes implied warranty and strict liability,
which are, if you will, wrongs without fault. Societal goals are
furthered, however, by deterring conduct which is faulty, in addition to deterring recurrent risk-generating products.
In the context of a product-injured user at fault, the result
would be a reduced recovery, rather than the all-or-nothing treatment of contributory negligence as a bar to recovery. When a
product has, however, turned out to be unsafe in fact, and thus
defective, but the user is also at fault and, as a result, another
person is injured, the conclusion should be not that there is a bar
to recovery against the manufacturer, but that the manufacturer
and the user should be treated as joint tortfeasors. Such treatment would retain both consistency and reason in accord with
tort law in general and products liability law in particular.
2.

Unprotected Misuse

The issue of misuse, sometimes treated as abnormal use
bearing on the question of defect,8 8 and sometimes as a proximate
cause issue,89 is usually a jury question, and remains so with the
approach we have been suggesting. If the use is grossly careless,
although initially within the ambit of intended use, the jury
might not find the actual injury-causing use to have been intended. There would thus be no breach of the implied warranty
of absolute safety. If a misuse is, however, reasonably foreseeable
as judged at the time of trial, it would remain a jury issue as to
whether the product's warranty of reasonable safety has been
breached. That is, recognizing the misuse, the issue would be
whether a reasonable manufacturer would still make and market
the product in the same way. If not, there is a breach. Finally, if
there has been a breach of the warranty of reasonable safety,
misuse by the user should reduce the injured user's damages,
utilizing the comparative fault system previously put forth.
88. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment h.
89. See Keeton, ProductLiability and the Automobile, 9 FORUM 1, 10-11 (1973).
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Breach and misuse would make available to an injured third
party, joint tortfeasors against whom to proceed; no breach of the
warranty of safety but misuse would still present the injured
party with a defendant-the user.
3. Assumption of the Risk
There is little to say about assumption of the risk that has
not been said by the California Supreme Court in Luque v.
McLean,9" the companion case to Cronin. It is extremely important, however, to bear in mind that the essence of true assumption of the risk, even of a patent risk, is a voluntary and unreasonable encounter with the specifically known risk. A plaintiff who
does so assume the risk is usually said to have relieved the defendant's duty toward him. 1 If any of the elements are missing, that
is, the assumption is not truly voluntary, the risk taken is reasonable, or the specific danger is not recognized and borne in mind
at time of injury, there is no assumption of risk.
The fact that a risk is patent or obvious should not, contrary
to the recently reaffirmed position of the New York Court of
Appeals, 91' operate as a bar to a finding of defectiveness. Since a
major thrust of strict products liability theory has been the elimination of recurrent risk-generating products, patent and obvious
risk generators should not automatically be exempted from liability. It may well be that a particular user will be barred by true
assumption of the risk, but the utilization of an objective patentlatent standard as a bar to recovery returns us rapidly to the
ordinary consumer test of an unreasonably dangerous product.
Such objective standards simply reverberate with negligence.
California has discarded negligence standards and strict liability
actions without making insurers out of defendants. New York
could easily do the same, within its warranty rationale.
Thus a user of a product who recognizes the danger in a
product, but who is induced or required to use the particular
product and is injured either while in a state of inadvertent,
careless, or normal use while using the product as it is intended
to be used, would not have assumed the risk whether the risk is
patent or latent. The warranty of safety would have been
breached, and the user's fault is, at most, a reason to reduce
90. 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
91. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS 440 (4th ed. 1971).

91.1 See Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617
(1973), reaffirming Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
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recovery. The bystander's treatment is apparent; he has not assumed the risk and will have either one or two tortfeasors against
whom to proceed, consistent with our previous discussion.
One other point might appropriately be made at this time.
If the rationale of strict products liability concerning the elimination of recurrent risk-generators is valid, not even true assumption of the risk should be a defense. If it remains a complete
defense, the result would be that which the California Supreme
Court decried in Pike v. Frank M. Hough Co. :92 the more patently
dangerous the product appears to the user, the less likely will
recovery be because the more probable will be the awareness of
the specific risk. Although issues of voluntariness and unreasonableness would remain, the odds would be substantially tipped in
the defendant's favor. The answer would appear to be to simply
treat assumption of the risk as another aspect of comparative
fault, that is, at the very most as a partial defense.
C. State of the Art
It has been said that because a product is defective or not at
the time of manufacture, design, and marketing, it must be
judged at that time.13 This is perfectly appropriate when the issue
is negligence. When the issue, however, becomes strict liability,
the emphasis should shift. We may be talking about a manufacturing defect not avoidable because of the state of the art at the
time, 4 but more likely the issue will be one of design.
One way to handle either problem is to impose a continuing
duty on the manufacturer to improve his product and treat his
response to the duty akin to negligence in the post-marketing
period prior to injury. 5 Another way is to treat state of the art as
a consideration, but not as a conclusive defense in itself. 6 Still
another is to recognize that the state of the art is generally a result
of industry priorities. Research and development funds for safety
purposes compete with other demands. If the product is judged
by the state of the art as it exists or could reasonably exist at the
time of trial, and the product is no longer made and marketed in
92. 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
93. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Badorek v.
General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App.3d 902, 934-36, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 327-28 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1970); Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890,
895 (1973).
94. Cf. O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
95. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 10 Cal. 3d 337, 515 P.2d 313, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 369 (1973); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964).
96. Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973).
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the same way, or should not be, the product is defective. All the
events bearing on that issue would be admissible, including product changes subsequent to injury. Since the safety of the product,
not fault, is the issue, compensation should follow, but it would
not be exacerbated by the passions of a determination of fault.
Products would continue to be improved, control would be exercised over the product throughout the period of its intended or
reasonably foreseeable life span, and the risk of injury would be
reduced or spread, which is, after all, where we started this discussion.
CONCLUSION

When this article was initially being prepared it was entitled
"Strict Liability: Fault or No-Fault and What Limits?" The tentative conclusion was that we should properly be talking about a
limited no-fault system, expunging all elements of negligence, as
suggested in Cronin. The conclusion remains the same, but the
method by which the conclusion has been reached differs from the
original approach.
Between planning and fulfillment of this article, Dean Page
Keeton of the University of Texas and Dean John Wade of Vanderbilt University have made the point that the Cronin case has
simply added to the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of defect, leaving lawyers, judges, juries, and appellate courts in a
state of confusion until some content is given to the concept of
"defect."9 This teacher and trial lawyer has attempted to give
some content to the concept, generally picking up the approach
that both deans have long championed. 8 The attempt herein has
been conceptual, and is in need of substantial refinement. Broad
areas of law and policy have been addressed which must be
brought down eventually to the level of instructions to a jury.
Even if the approach is consistent and workable, there is a long
way to go. If the approach is wrong, many of us will continue to
seek the light at the end of the tunnel we call "defect" and hopefully reach it before too many more years elapse.
97. Keeton, Product Liability and the Automobile, 9 FoiurM 1, 28 (1973); Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829-33 (1973).
98. See note 28 supra.
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